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The failed bid for control of Qantas reveals a multitude of weak 
points in the governance of management buyouts. The paper 
situates the Qantas collapse within the context of an increasingly 
acrimonious global debate over the utility of private equity 
financing. Regulators in the United States, Australia and the 
United Kingdom have expressed concern that unrestricted 
expansion increases the risk of market manipulation and macro-
economic instability. The paper evaluates whether such concerns 
are justified by investigating the impact of private equity across a 
number of critical pressure points within the corporation and 
between it and those providing the intermediating services required 
to remain in or exit the public market. 
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Leveraged Buy-Outs of publicly listed corporations resolve (ostensibly, 
partially and temporarily) a central conundrum of corporate governance.
1 
While the recombination of equity and control unquestionably limits 
managerial discretion, governance arbitrage through market exit raises a 
series of critical oversight questions. These exist and play out across 
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1 Michael Jensen, ‘Eclipse of the Public Corporation’ (1989) 67 Harvard Business 
Review 61; for original conceptual formulation, see Adolph A Berles and Gardiner C 
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932). 
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multiple levels of the corporate governance matrix.
2 Concern radiates 
from the micro level of individual transactions to the mezzanine impact 
on particular industrial and financial sectors. The identified threats 
encompass potential (or actual) conflicts of interest among managers 
involved in market exit proposals. At market governance level they 
involve potential (or actual) abuse of fiduciary duty by those providing 
corporate advisory services.
3 The industry thrives at times of high 
liquidity, cheap debt and low levels of corporate default, conditions that 
pertain on global markets presently.
4 The increasingly erratic behaviour 
of debt markets has prompted, however, fears of wider supranational 
systemic risk.
5
Across the globe, the clearly expressed policy preference is for 
the market to exercise self-restraint when interdicting with LBOs. The 
Takeovers Panel in Australia has articulated a series of protocols to be 
adopted by the boards of target corporations.
6 A similar dynamic informs 
recent Delaware Court of Chancery jurisprudence.
7 At the mezzanine 
 
2 The asset class disperses technical and material capital at all stages of the investment 
process. The provision of venture capital is relatively unproblematic. Facilitating start-
ups and job creation underpin the industry’s normative claims, see British Venture 
Capital Association, The Economic Impact of Private Equity in the UK (2006). The focus 
of the present article is on the main mechanism used to exit the market, the Leveraged 
Buy-Out (‘LBO’) or Management Buy-Out (‘MBO’). Within this paper the terms private 
equity and LBO/MBO are used interchangeably and refer to market exit unless otherwise 
specified. 
3 The problem is a symptom of all mergers and acquisition booms. For review of 
recent cases in the United States, see Gretchen Morgenson, ‘Whispers of Mergers 
Set Off Suspicious Trading’, New York Times (New York), 27 August 2006, A1; 
Kara Scannell, ‘Insider Trading: It’s Back with a Vengeance’, Wall Street Journal 
(New York), 5 May 2007, B1. 
4 William Rhodes, ‘A Market Correction Is Coming, This Time for Real’, Financial 
Times (London), 29 March 2007, 11 (arguing that ‘pockets of excess are becoming harder 
to ignore’). 
5 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report (2007) 15. 
6 Takeovers Panel, ‘Insider Participation in Control Transactions’ Issue Paper No 19 
(2007); see also the final Guidance Note published on 7 June 2007: Takeovers Panel, 
‘Insider Participation in Control Transactions’ Guidance Note No 19 (2007). 
7 See Re Netsmart Technologies, Inc Shareholders Litigation, Del CA 2573 VCS 
(criticising the failure of the board to solicit a higher bid: at 21); Re SS&C Technologies, 
Del CA 1525 VCL (striking down a proposed settlement because ‘basic questions 
concerning the process pursued by the management are left unexplored and unanswered’: 
at 2). For a review of Delaware jurisprudence relating to takeovers, see Marcel Kahan, 
‘Jurisprudential and Transactions Developments in Takeovers’ in Klaus Hopt et al (eds), 
Comparative Corporate Governance (1998) 683. Charting an Icarian Flightpath  3 
level, warnings of the increased risk of insider trading and market 
manipulation are designed, primarily, to trigger an industry-led 
calibration of internal compliance programs.
8 This signalling has been 
accompanied by the exercise of unsubtle pressure on those providing 
core capital and leveraged debt. The superannuation industry has been 
cautioned against over-investing in illiquid heavily leveraged assets.
9 
Within the banking sector the loosening of contractual covenants 
(making borrowing conditions much more favourable) has been 
identified as a major contributing factor to systemic threats at each level 
of control.
10
Leading private equity practitioners in New York, London and 
Sydney agree that the global dependency on leverage is highly risky. 
‘The market that is most overblown and most dangerous and the scariest 
is the leveraged finance market’, remarks John Barber, Managing Partner 
of Citigroup Private Equity in New York. ‘It is those markets silliness 
that is allowing most of the private equity boom.’ The weakening of 
contractual covenants is, as he puts it, ‘the cherry on top of the whipped 
cream on top of the ice cream’ for private equity.
11 Across the Atlantic in 
                                                 
8 Financial Services Authority, ‘Private Equity: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory 
Engagement’ (Discussion Paper 06/06, 2006) 9; see also Financial Services Authority, 
‘Private Equity, A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement’ (Feedback Statement 
07/03, 2007) 7.  The Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’) has established a Financial 
Crime and Intelligence Division to target market abuse, money laundering and fraud, see 
FSA, ‘New FSA Team to Crack Down on Financial Crime’ (Press Release, 22 January 
2007). The Chair of the Federal Reserve in the United States has also highlighted the 
threat of market manipulation, see Ben Bernanke, ‘Regulation and Financial Innovation’ 
(Speech delivered at the Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia, 15 May 
2007) 6. 
9 Peter Costello, ‘Opening Address’ (Speech delivered at the ASIC Summer School, 
Sydney, 5 March 2007). 
10 On calls for restraint, see Presidential Working Group and US Agency Principals, 
Agreement on Principles and Guidelines Regarding Private Pools of Capital (2007) 3. 
Already there are signs that the policy approach is hardening slightly, with a particular 
focus on the propensity of lenders to provide ‘bridge financing’ in order to gain access to 
lucrative underwriting and debt securitisation assignments, see Greg Ip, ‘Fed, Other 
Regulators Turn Attention to Risk in Lenders LBO Lending’, Wall Street Journal (New 
York), 18 May 2007, C1; for acceptance of structural imperatives in the marketplace, see 
FSA,  ‘Discussion Paper 06/06’, above n 8, 60 (suggesting the covenant loosening is 
linked to the perception that the corporations targeted are much more profitable and thus 
less likely to default: at 59. The study also found that relationship banking has declined, 
competitive auctions have increased, a synthesis that reduces meaningful restraints: at 
60). 
11 Interview with John Barber (New York, 24 April 2007). World Economy and Finance Working Paper  4 
 
                                                
London, the Group Communications Director of 3i, one of Europe’s 
largest private equity groups, accepts ‘covenants are of variable 
quality’.
12 Both suggest, however, that it is essential to disaggregate 
irrational lending from rational borrowing. Moreover, in high growth 
markets such as Australia, the industry argues less than three per cent of 
all loans are made to private equity backed-business.
13 This raises a 
critical question. If the direct risk posed is statistically insignificant, why 
has private equity generated such opposition that it has become ‘the 
whipping boy’ of wider market forces?
14
The size and quality of corporations now targeted increases 
political salience. Low price to earning ratios, for example, makes large 
scale capitalised US companies arguably one of the cheapest asset 
classes available. Even accounting for the frothiness of today’s market, 
with an average ratio of 16.9, the S&P index remains 1.9 per cent below 
a 20 year average (and substantially below the peak of 27.8 encountered 
at the peak of the dot-com bubble in 2000). Similarly, low levels of 
corporate debt make Australian corporations particularly attractive, as 
indeed does large swathes of the Asia-Pacific.
15 At divisional level, 
global divestiture of non-core assets to generate earnings has 
disproportionately benefited the private equity industry. Arguably, its 
leading practitioners have perfected the art of the sale rather than 
discovered a magic formula to generate longer-term growth.
16 In part, the 
problem for the industry is endogenous. Flawed presentation, coupled 
with the extraordinary personal returns and transaction fees associated 
 
12 Interview with Patrick Dunne (London, 23 March 2007). 
13 Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, 
Canberra, 1 May 2007, 4 (Australian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association 
Limited (‘AVCAL’)). 
14 Interview with John Barber, above n 11; see also Douglas Lowenstein (President, 
Private Equity Council), House Financial Services Committee, United States Congress, 
Washington DC (16 May 2007) 6–7. 
15 ‘Private Equity Has Eyes on Developing World’, Australian Financial Review 
(Sydney), 18 May 2007, 40. 
16 KPMG, ‘Increasing Value from Disposal’ (Press Release, 28 February 2007), 
(reporting that 46 per cent of corporate sellers in a global survey of mergers and 
acquisitions decision-makers felt that they had not maximised value from disposal). 
Private equity financiers have fared substantially better, most recently. The most glaring 
example surrounds the sale of Hertz by Ford and its subsequent listing, see below n 57 
and accompanying text; see also Geoffrey Newman, ‘Airport Sale Nets Macquarie 
$115m’,  The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 19–20 May 2007, 32 (on Macquarie 
Airport’s sale of its share in Birmingham Airport to the Ontario Teachers Plan Board) 
after failing to gain a majority shareholding). Charting an Icarian Flightpath  5 
with these deals, inevitably invokes ‘the politics of envy’.
17 Proponent 
confidence in a perceived superior operating model, linked to a 
doctrinaire defence of laissez-faire economics, has bordered, at times, on 
arrogance.
18 Articulating such a narrow vision of utility makes the 
political establishment nervous. National elections are pending in three 
of the most important private equity markets — the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Australia. In such circumstances, conspicuous 
consumption is not necessarily an advisable public relations strategy.
19 It 
is not surprising therefore that political defences tend to emanate from 
those insulated from electoral competition, such as the libertarian 
European Union Commissioner for Internal Markets, Charlie 
McCreevy.
20
Paradoxically, the primary virtue associated with private equity, 
namely its capacity to evade the public disclosure regime, has become a 
major problem. It has made the industry particularly vulnerable to 
critiques based on transparency and accountability. While opacity is 
common to many alternative investment vehicles, including esoteric 
derivative trading, private equity has a very public face. Moreover, the 
                                                 
17 Editorial, ‘Politics of Envy Alive and Well’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 18 
May 2007; see also Leon Gettler, ‘In the Politics of Pay, It’s up to Us to Show Them the 
Money’,  The Age (Melbourne), 19 May 2007, 6–7. For the United States, see Kara 
Scannell, ‘House Clears an Executive Pay Measure’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 21 
April 2007, A3 (reporting on the 269 to 134 passage of a Bill that would give 
shareholders the right to vote on a non-binding resolution on executive compensation); 
see also House Financial Services Committee, United States Congress, Washington DC, 
Private Equity’s Effects on Workers and Firms (16 May 2007). 
18 Alan Murray, ‘Private Equity’s Successes Stir Up a Backlash that May Be 
Misdirected’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 9 February 2007, A9 (quoting David 
Rubinstein of the Carlyle Group saying private equity had done ‘an awful job’ in public 
relations terms because of its tendency to ‘brag about how much money we make); see 
also Philip Yea, ‘Do We Condemn or Cheer the Flight to Private Equity’, Financial 
Times (London), 15 February 2007, 15 (Yea, who is chief executive of 3i, was 
unapologetic: ‘While it may seem unfair that the private equity model has the advantage, 
that surely is the point of capitalism — that those with the advantage win’: at 15). 
19 Stephen Swartzmann, co-founder of the Blackstone Group, held a lavish party in New 
York to celebrate his 60
th birthday, featuring performances by Rod Stewart and Patti 
LaBelle, see Nelson Schwartz, ‘Wall Street’s Man of the Moment’, Fortune (New York), 
5 March 2007, 40–3. There is no suggestion whatsoever that the event was in any way 
inappropriate (eg, Dennis Kozlowski’s use of Tyco money to hold a party in Sardinia for 
his wife). The point is that enhancing visibility in such a manner generates questions 
about how the money is made. 
20 Charlie McCreevy, ‘Private Equity: Getting It Right’ (Speech delivered to the All 
Parliamentary Group, British Venture Capital Association, London, 22 March 2007). World Economy and Finance Working Paper  6 
 
                                                
extent to which iconic (and profitable) corporations are being 
restructured has an immediate market as well as socio-political impact. 
This has prompted unexpected and forthright criticism from within the 
financial establishment. Michael Gordon, one of the most influential 
fund managers in the City of London, caused consternation recently with 
a scathing rejection of the private equity model: 
 
Institutions and their advisers are choosing to move into a 
form of investment that provides little real diversification from 
equities over time; comes with higher risks because of 
leverage; has far less transparency than a portfolio of listed 
stocks — and for which the institution has to pay premium 
fees. Am I the only one struggling to make sense of this.
21
 
The intervention undoubtedly serves the entrenched interests of the fund 
management industry, which has seen pension funds in the United 
Kingdom expend proportionately more capital into private equity 
vehicles. When asked directly did he believe private equity investment 
was being missold, Michael Gordon not only replied in the affirmative 
but felt that the pension funds largely lacked the sophistication to even 
know it.
22 Much more significantly, the unease within the City of 
London has unsettled stable alliances. Leading financiers have attempted 
to blunt political sensitivity by expressing concern about worker and 
wider stakeholder rights.
23 In the process, the sedimentary foundations of 
market capitalism have been disturbed.  
From London to Canberra (and, to a limited extent, Washington) 
it has proved impossible to limit discussion of private equity to 
technocratic analysis.
24 This is not necessarily without normative value. 
 
21 Michael Gordon, Letter to the Editor, Financial Times (London), 31 January 2007, 14. 
Open contestation within the City of London about asset class utility and how to regulate 
it is not only unusual, it inevitably politicises the issue, see generally Michael Moran, The 
British Regulatory State (2002). 
22 Interview with Michael Gordon (London, 23 March 2007). 
23 Jim Pickard and Peter Smith, ‘Myners Warns of Risks from Private Equity’, Financial 
Times (London), 20 February 2007, 1 (concern that private equity threatened job security 
and benefits); for opposition within industrial conglomerates, see Jon Ashworth and 
Allister Heath, ‘The Barbarians Back at the Gate’, The Business (London), 3 February 
2007, 18–20. 
24 House Financial Services Committee, Private Equity’s Effects on Workers and Firms, 
above n 17; Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Inquiry into the Private Equity 
Investment and Its Effects on Capital Markets and the Australian Economy, Parliament of 
Australia, Canberra, 18 March 2007; Treasury Select Committee, Transparency in Charting an Icarian Flightpath  7 
Disputation generates the opportunity to partially reconstruct the social 
contract governing the corporation and the market in which it is nested.
25 
This occurs for three interconnected reasons, sketched here but explored 
in more detail below. First, the LBO exposes the control limitations of 
the extant corporate governance paradigm. Notwithstanding the 
mediating effect of attempts to inculcate responsible corporate 
citizenship, governance is largely presented as a mechanism to ensure 
shareholder protection. Positing wealth maximisation for shareholders as 
the primary purpose of the corporation reduces the capacity of 
governance to deal with the ideational challenge presented by private 
equity.
26 Given that most LBOs offer substantial premiums over 
underlying market prices shareholders are rarely compromised, unless 
the sale process is itself fundamentally flawed. This suggests the need to 
rearticulate both the objectives of corporate governance and strategies 
required to protect stakeholders from the vagaries of a financial 
revolution. 
Second, these internal deficiencies are magnified at market level 
because of transactional dynamics (particularly in sectors or jurisdictions 
in which one institutional actor has overwhelming presence). This 
dominance can impoverish the capacity of those providing corporate 
advisory services to either caution or exercise restraint. More generally, 
the dynamics of private equity make the efficacy of the gatekeeper 
function accorded to intermediaries by law or professional norms 
potentially unsustainable in the longer term. Amelioration of potential 
excess requires market participants to reach fundamental agreement on 
the social function of regulation irrespective of whether a rules or 
principles based approach is adopted. 
                                                                                                             
Financial Markets and the Structure of UK PLC, Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
London, 20 March 2007. The UK inquiry covers ‘the effects of the current corporate 
status of private equity funds, including both their domicile and ownership structure’, 
taxation implications and the wider socio-economic context, terms of reference that were 
subsequently adopted by its Australian counterpart. 
25 Here it is important to emphasise that shareholders do not fit into this class. To be sure, 
it is necessary to ensure that the procedures governing MBOs are conducted in an open, 
fair and transparent manner, but with most offering substantial premiums on historic 
trading patterns, the shareholder is rarely disadvantaged. 
26 Justin O’Brien, ‘Managing Conflicts: The Sisyphean Tragedy (and Absurdity) of 
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation Reform’ (2007) 20 Australian Journal 
of Corporate Law 317. World Economy and Finance Working Paper  8 
 
                                                
Third, private equity’s continued expansion is predicated on 
securing an increasing share of pension fund asset allocation. In the 
Australian context, it is unfortunate that submissions to a Senate Inquiry 
have adopted an unnecessarily defensive tone.
27 At issue is not the 
legitimacy of private equity; rather how the financial and social impact 
can be managed. A focused dialogue can generate protocols designed to 
further ultimate societal as well as proximate wealth maximisation goals. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, the 
structural determinants of the private equity market are mapped. Second, 
I demonstrate how the battle for control of Qantas crystallises the latent 
and extant risks within and between critical nodes in the corporate 
governance matrix. Third, it evaluates differential regulatory and 
jurisprudential responses. In the final section the paper argues if the LBO 
offered a true and lasting solution to intrinsic and intractable corporate 
governance problems, its remarkable renaissance should be uniformly 
welcomed. In reality, however, the locus of the principal–agent conflict it 
ostensibly solves is displaced to a largely unregulated arena, which, in 
turn, exacerbates potential systemic oversight deficiencies.  
 
I A  CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD 
 
The seemingly unstoppable global rise in private equity continued in 
2006. The frenetic pace of change is encapsulated in the fact that nine of 
the ten largest LBOs took place in the past 18 months.
28 The record set in 
the RJR Nabisco takeover stood for 17 years. In 2006, Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts broke the record by acquiring HCA, a US-based healthcare 
corporation, for US$33 billion. Its private equity rival, Blackstone 
Partners, eclipsed this with the purchase of Equities Office Property 
 
27 Submissions to an Australian parliamentary inquiry by the superannuation industry 
suggested the political fears were unfounded. UniSuper, for example, noted the 
importance of private equity to asset portfolio balance within appropriate stress levels 
(2.5–7.5 per cent of total investments), see Submission to Senate Standing Committee on 
Economics, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 26 April 2007 (UniSuper) stating it will 
not ‘shun buyout managers, public to private deals, or private equity more generally’ but 
seek ‘to manage these risks through sound portfolio construction and manager selection’: 
at 6; see also Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of 
Australia, Canberra, May 2007 (Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees), 
drawing a distinction between positive investment in venture capital and more 
problematic corporate-raiders, which can be dealt with through corporate governance 
procedures: at 9. 
28 ‘Will Street Pity the Fools’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 5 January 2007, C14. Charting an Icarian Flightpath  9 
Trust for US$38.9 billion (including debt).
29 Now even that looks likely 
to be surpassed with the planned acquisition of TXU, a Texas utility and 
the sale by Daimler of Chrysler to Cerberus Capital Management, which 
will involve raising US$65 billion in debt.
30 Key to the deal is a 
restructuring of pension liabilities. If Cerberus is successful it could put 
the other Detroit automakers into play and place private equity squarely 
in the mainstream of corporate finance.
31 The renaissance appears to 
confirm a controversial hypothesis first advanced in 1989 that we are 
witnessing ‘the eclipse of the public corporation’
32 Before evaluating the 
factors that have facilitated the global renaissance of private equity, it is 
necessary to discuss the industry’s modus operandi. 
 
A  Inside the Alchemist Workshop 
 
Despite the exponential increase in the number of private equity 
investment vehicles, the operating structure has remained remarkably 
homogeneous.
33 The archetypal private equity fund tends to coalesce 
                                                 
29 Blackstone sold US$22 billion worth of the EOP portfolio within weeks of the 
purchase, see ‘Blackstone Profit is $2bn on Sales’, Chicago Tribune (Chicago), 14 March 
2007 (online edition). 
30 Cerberus Capital Management has US$16.5 billion of assets under management, 
including ownership of Air Canada. Like many private equity firms it has excellent 
political connections. Cerberus is chaired by the former Treasury Secretary John Snow. It 
is perhaps unfortunate that, according to Greek myth, Cerberus was a three-headed dog 
with a snake for a tail that guarded the gates of Hades.  
31 Gina Chon, Jason Singer and Jeffrey McCracken, ‘Chrysler Deal Heralds New 
Direction for Detroit’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 15 May 2006, A1. 
32 Jensen, ‘Eclipse of the Public Corporation’, above n 1; see also Michael Jensen, ‘The 
Modern Industrial Revolution: Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Mechanisms’ 
(1993) 48 Journal of Finance 831, 869–70; see also Jensen’s contribution in ‘Morgan 
Stanley Roundtable on Private Equity and Its Import for Public Companies’ (2006) 18 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8, 12 (arguing that the risk of failure is minimised 
by structural barriers to cross subsidisation). 
33 For overview of the industry, see Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Money of 
Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New Wealth (3
rd ed, 2004); Josh Lerner, Felda 
Hardymon and Ann Leamon, Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook (3
rd ed, 
2004). For pen profiles of major institutional actors and their investment philosophies, 
see Jennifer Hewett, ‘Private Lives’, Australian Financial Review Magazine (Sydney), 
February 2007, 44–53; Henry Sender, ‘Inside the Minds of Kravis, Roberts’, Wall Street 
Journal (New York), 3 January 2007, A1; see more generally ‘The Uneasy Crown’, 
Economist (London), 10 February 2007, 69–71; Katie Benner et al, ‘The Power List’, 
Fortune (New York), 5 March 2007, 45–50. World Economy and Finance Working Paper  10 
 
                                                
around a limited liability partnership model.
34 The manner in which 
private equity players in the United States are listing does little to change 
this dynamic.
35 Each fund has a finite operating lifespan, normally 10 
years, which is under the control of a General Partner. The General 
Partner decides strategic focus and portfolio balance. It conducts due 
diligence on planned acquisitions, recruits or disposes operational 
management, and decides divestiture policy. The model precludes the 
investors, known as limited partners, from exercising any direct decision-
making role (as indeed are institutional investors under the public 
corporation). Operational discretion is limited only by the size of the 
capital initially raised, any contractual covenants negotiated by the 
investors, or subsequently imposed by institutional lenders.
36 Examples 
of the former include limits on geographic or industry exposure, as well 
as detailed guidelines on what constitutes due diligence and whether 
external validation of valuations are required pre-purchase.
37 Post-
purchase, a critical governance concern is to prevent controlling interest 
expropriation through excessive fee charging. Disputes are resolved by 
recourse to private law. Little or no room for external oversight over 
freedom to contract is envisaged. In the public sphere, the securities 
regulator, for example, can demand changes to a company prospectus. 
By contrast the private equity contract is negotiated almost entirely 
 
34 Some major holding funds do trade publicly in their own right, for example, the fully 
listed 3i in the United Kingdom and Onex Partners in Canada. There are however 
significant differences in operating styles. 3i, for example, invests across the whole range 
of private equity, from venture capital, through ‘patient’ minority shareholding to LBOs. 
Unlike many of its competitors, 3i does not engage in club deals nor does it target large-
capitalised corporations, factors that have minimised its risk profile: interview with 
Patrick Dunne, above n 12. 
35 See Dennis Berman, Henry Sender and Gregory Zuckerman, ‘Blackstone Aims to 
Keep Control as Public Entity’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 23 March 2007, A1 
(reporting that shares will be offered in the underlying management vehicle, which will 
be structured as a limited partnership). In this Blackstone is following the example of 
Fortress Investment Group, which sought a partial listing in February 2007 and the model 
already followed by Onex in Canada, which sees its chief executive control the firm 
through a complex share structure that gives him the right to select 60 per cent of the 
board while controlling less than 25 per cent of the equity, see Karen Richardson and 
Jason Singer, ‘Private Equity, Public Offerings Have a History’, Wall Street Journal 
(New York), 2 April 2007, A1. Private equity firms are not alone in adopting such a 
strategy. A similar move was associated with the Google IPO in 2004. 
36 See Douglas Cumming and Sofia Johan, ‘Is It the Law or the Lawyers? Investment 
Covenants Around the World’ (2006) 12 European Financial Management 535, 539–41. 
37 See AVCAL, above n 13, 9. Charting an Icarian Flightpath  11 
behind closed doors, with non-disclosure clauses limiting discussion of 
either terms or investments. 
The Limited Partner commits a specified percentage of capital, 
which is drawn (on demand) as required. The partnership is structured to 
minimise liability in the event of an individual corporate failure within 
the portfolio (for example by capping the percentage of overall capital 
deployed in single investments and curtailing cross-subsidisation). 
Management fees are normally pegged at between one and three per cent 
of the total committed (although they may be front-loaded). The 
maximum return on investment is normally capped at 80 per cent, net of 
specific transaction fees, including the purchase of technical legal and 
accounting advice.
38 Known as ‘carried interest’, this premium may, 
however, be subject to the fund exceeding a pre-determined success rate 
(for example, a certain percentage return). 
Initial investment is normally committed within the first five 
years of the fund. This enhances the maximisation of returns before the 
fund elapses and capital returned (unless contractually varied). The 
General Partner has a vested interest to close the fund well in advance of 
formal closure. Redemption signals higher investment returns, eases 
subsequent marketing and obviate potential conflicts of interest between 
competing internal investment funds. 
In practice, access to this most illiquid of asset classes is 
restricted to institutional and accredited investors and a limited number 
of high net worth individuals.
39 Relative opacity has, however, made the 
industry vulnerable to criticism. Exemption from public law disclosure 
obligations in the United States, for example, has been presented as 
evasion.
40 Recent research suggests increased disclosure could enhance 
deal flow by making the asset class more attractive to a greater range of 
risk-averse institutional investors.
41 Conversely, leading private equity 
                                                 
38 Joseph Bartlett and W Eric Swan, ‘Private Equity Funds: What Counts and What 
Doesn’t’ (2001) 26 Journal of Corporate Law 393, 398. 
39 An exception is when the private equity management group partially or fully lists. 
Here, however, the public investor does not have access to the funds under management 
rather in the profits accruing to the management group itself (net of operating costs). 
40 Steve Hurdle, ‘A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming the System of Private Equity 
Fund Disclosures’ (2005) 53 University of California Los Angeles Law Review 239, 244–
50. 
41 Douglas Cumming and Sofia Johan, ‘Regulatory Harmonisation and the Development 
of Private Equity Markets’ (Law and Economics Workshop No 13, University of 
California, Berkeley, 2006) 28. World Economy and Finance Working Paper  12 
 
                                                
funds wish to maintain discretion over either portfolio performance or 
the mix of investors in each fund to protect proprietary intellectual 
capital. Disclosure could also erode the alchemist mystique associated 
with already (apparently) successful funds, which is used to justify 
managerial fees. What is also clear, however, is the marked diversity in 
fund performance. 
Inordinate focus on increased deal scalability risks 
misconceiving the private equity market. Size is not necessarily an 
accurate indicator of performance.
42 Only the top quartile of private 
equity funds in the United States has outperformed the market, although 
European funds have fared rather better.
43 Given the statistical evidence 
of patchy performance, it is necessary to more finely granulate why 
private equity has captured the ideational zeitgeist. 
 
B  Back to the Future: The Return of the LBO 
 
Earlier periods of sustained merger and acquisition activity tended to be 
concentrated, corresponding to sector-specific shocks, such as 
deregulation, privatisation or maturation.
44 Evidence from the LBO 
boom in United States and the United Kingdom, and, more recently, 
Australia cannot be so readily explained. Linguistic change underscores 
the extent of the metamorphosis. The ‘corporate raider’ has 
transmogrified into the ‘sponsor’ of ‘portfolio companies’. Chrematistic 
financial engineering has been transformed into governance arbitrage. 
Private equity is no longer perceived as the domain of corporate 
extortionists, a characterisation graphically, if erroneously, depicted in 
the quintessential account of the chaotic RJR Nabisco takeover battle.
45 
 
42 Steve Kaplan and Antoinette Schoar, ‘Private Equity Performance: Returns, 
Persistence and Capital Flows’ (2005) 60 Journal of Finance 1791; Josh Lerner, 
Antoinette Schoar and Wan Wang, ‘Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited 
Partner Performance Puzzle’ (Research Paper No 4523–05, Sloan School of 
Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005). For empirical study 
suggesting major overvaluations linked to calculation based on gross rather than net 
returns, see Ludovic Pahalippou and Oliver Gottschalg, ‘The Performance of Private 
Equity Funds’ (Working Paper, EFA Moscow Meetings 2005, INSEAD, Paris, 2006). 
43 Neil Harper and Antoon Schnneider, ‘Private Equity’s New Challenge’ (2004) The 
McKinsey Quarterly 2. 
44 Mark Mitchell and John Mulherin, ‘The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and 
Restructuring Activity’ (1996) 41 Journal of Financial Economics 193. 
45 Bryan Burroughs and John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gates (1990); Connie Bruck, The 
Predators’ Ball, The Inside Story of Drexham Burnham and the Rise of the Junk Bond Charting an Icarian Flightpath  13 
Many senior banking and managerial executives have expressed a 
preference for undertaking consultancy for private equity funds rather 
than take up board positions with publicly listed corporations.
46 Despite 
the changed corporate landscape, the narrow normative claim advanced 
by the industry has remained constant. Now, as then, proponents point to 
four interlinked advantages associated with (even a temporary) public 
market exit. 
First, the private equity fund recombines equity, knowledge and 
control. Due diligence undertaken in advance of an acquisition generates 
superior technical and market intelligence.
47 The key is not simply 
financial engineering but rather, it is claimed, a superior governance 
model.
48 Peter Yates, the Chief Executive of Allco Equity Partners used 
a seminar at the Methodist conference centre in Sydney in May 2007 to 
propagate the sector’s work ethic. ‘Financial engineering’, he said, ‘does 
not make a bad deal good; it can make a good deal great.’
49 What he 
omitted to mention is that the transactional risk is often transferred at an 
early stage. The private equity fund uses additional debt obligation to 
rapidly repay initial capital outlay. The banks underwriting the debt issue 
also reduce their exposure, through securitising and on-selling the debt.
50 
                                                                                                             
Raiders (1989); James B Stewart, Den of Thieves (1993); see also, however, Michael 
Jensen and Donald Chew, US Corporate Governance: Lessons From the 1980s (1997), 
available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=146150> (characterising the rise in LBOs as 
an overdue attack on entrenched and profligate management which had been deliberately 
misunderstood by a populist media reporting). 
46 Glenda Korporaal, ‘Clarke Lashes Out at Governance Laws’, The Australian (Sydney), 
28 March 2007, 21 (reporting that the founder of Macquarie Bank would not take up any 
public directorships on his retirement, because he did not think ‘the risks and the package 
are worth it’: at 21). 
47The capacity to generate and evaluate this research is a further reason why investors are 
drawn to boutique investment houses. 
48 Jensen, ‘Morgan Stanley Roundtable’, above n 32, 13. 
49 Peter Yates (Speech delivered at the ASX Investor Hour, Australian Shareholder 
Association, Sydney, 15 May 2007). For evidence that financial engineering plays more 
significant role than organisational form, see Robert Cressy, Federico Munari and 
Alessandro Maliero, Playing to Their Strengths? Evidence that Specialisation in the 
Private Equity Industry Confers Competitive Advantage (February 2007), available at 
<http//ssrn.com/abstract=964367>. 
50 FSA, ‘Discussion Paper 06/06’, above n 8, 13 (reporting survey evidence from the 
most active banks operating in London. Equity financing mushroomed from €58 billion 
to €67.9 billion between June 2005 and July 2006. It also found, however, that the risk 
was quickly parcelled out to other lenders. The evidence suggests that bank exposure is 
reduced to 19.4 per cent of original investment within 120 days: at 14). Two further 
factors are apparent In the Asia-Pacific region. Firstly, liquidity has increased World Economy and Finance Working Paper  14 
 
                                                                                                            
Increasingly, this debt is finding its way onto the retail market through 
the marketing of unsecured debentures.
51
A critical refinement to public corporate governance is a 
simplification of the controlling mechanism. Lines of authority and 
responsibility are clarified and subject to ongoing review.
52 The fund 
may accept the operational plan put forward by entrenched management 
or, more regularly, provide it with syndicated in-house expertise drawn 
from a burgeoning range of executives recruited to either provide a 
consulting service or give credibility to future acquisition targets.
53 It is 
further argued that proximity of the owner to the decision-making 
process allows for any strategy reformulations to be agreed and 
implemented quickly.
54 Recent research suggests the most successful 
deals are informed by constant engagement with operational 
management, particularly in the first three months.
55 Particularly in cases 
involving the acquisition of subsidiaries this engagement reduces 
 
dramatically as a consequence of Chinese corporate IPO activity on the Hong Kong and, 
to a lesser extent, London markets. The additional income cannot be repatriated into 
China because of inflationary fears. As a result, this capital is put increasingly into 
securitised private equity debt; see Anthony Neoh, ‘China’s Financial Markets — Growth 
Opportunity and Challenge’ (Speech delivered at the ASIC Summer School, Sydney, 5 
March 2007). 
51 For regulatory fears associated with retail exposure in the liberal Australian 
marketplace, see Joanne Gray, ‘ASIC Agnostic on Private Equity’, Australian Financial 
Review (Sydney), 16 May 2007, 10. 
52 The Australian Venture Capital Association suggests two critical advantages include ‘a 
board less driven by process’ and recouping of ‘valuable time (up to 20 per cent) that was 
previously spent representing the company to the investor community,’ see AVCAL 
above n 13, 11. 
53 Erin White and Joann Lublin, ‘Private Equity Firms Stock Up on Executives’, Wall 
Street Journal (New York), 16 May 2007, B1. When the fund builds up a corporate 
presence but does not have full control it can use its stake to execute change, see Nick 
Tabakoff, ‘Venture Capital Blamed as PBL Media Bones Eddie McGuire’, The Weekend 
Australian (Sydney), 19–20 May 2007, 31 (reporting the departing CEO’s claim that he 
left because he ‘didn’t want to be an accountant’ and focus on ‘financial mechanics’: at 
31). 
54 See Lucinda Schmidt, ‘Surviving Private Equity’, Australian Financial Review Boss 
Magazine (Sydney), May 2007, 46–51 (emphasising the speed of decision-making in a 
range of Australian and New Zealand firms acquired by global private equity firms); see 
also UniSuper, above n 27 (suggesting private equity firms have ‘the best and most 
effective form of governance’ but warning that ‘strong growth in the size of the private 
equity market and the dramatic increase in the number of managers and investors in these 
markets may have led to the information asymmetry arbitrage being eroded’: at 3).  
55 Andreas Beroutsos, Andrew Freeman and Conor Kehoe, ‘What Public Companies Can 
Learn from Private Equity’ (2007) McKinsey on Finance 1–5.? Charting an Icarian Flightpath  15 
corporate dependency and, if handled adroitly, energise frontline staff. 
This perspective is particularly propagated in the retail arena, where sales 
personnel are often provided with profit-sharing incentives.
56
Second, linking incentive payments to actual rather than relative 
performance aligns the interests of both the portfolio client manager and 
the fund’s delegated representative. Generally, the private equity 
executive’s own bonus is tied to the performance of his charge rather 
than the fund as a whole. Third, the LBO generally allows for a longer 
term planning process. The industry presents itself as purveyors of 
‘patient capital; with portfolio companies are held for at least three years 
before exit through re-listing in an Initial Public Offering or on-sold.
57 
This gives temporary relief from earnings management imperatives 
associated with the public markets and allows for the deployment of 
investment that could, in the public markets, invoke a credit downgrade 
or trigger a share price reduction.
58 Fourth, and most controversially, 
                                                 
56 Fiona Tyndall and Allan Jury, ‘My Store’, Australian Financial Review Boss Magazine 
(Sydney), February 2007, 17–20 (reporting the staff had been energised. Rather than 
viewing the changes with suspicion, they had acted like ‘a whole bunch of unshackled 
horses’: at 17). See also Richard Gluyas, ‘Meyer’s Makeover Reaps $1bn’, The 
Australian (Sydney), 28 March 2007, 21 (reporting an 84 per cent rise in profits since the 
acquisition). 
57 If market conditions permit, LBO funds will re-list very quickly. The most glaring 
example involved the car rental company, Hertz. It was bought in December 2005 by a 
consortium that included the Carlyle Group and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity 
Partners, six months after Ford decided not to proceed with its own IPO. The investors 
paid a total of US$14 billion for the company, US$2.3 billion in cash, the remainder 
leveraged. George Tamke, a Clayton Dubilier & Reid partner named Chairman of the 
Board of Directors opined: ‘the company’s underlying strengths — an exceptional global 
brand, premium pricing supported by superior customer service and a history   of 
industry innovation — form a strong platform on which to pursue further growth 
initiatives’, see CD&R (Press Release, 12 September 2005). The LBO group took on a 
further US$6 billion loan, paid out a US$1 billion dividend and announced an intention to 
re-float seven months later. The partnership received a further US$500m bonus payment 
on completion of the offering on 15 November 2006. See generally David Henry and 
Emily Thornton, ‘Buy It, Flip It, then Strip It’, Businessweek (New York), 7 August 
2006, 28–31. Although share prices have been sustained and marginally increased, so too 
has the level of the market making it difficult to ascertain whether real value has been 
generated. For overview, see Jerry Cao and Josh Lerner, The Performance of Reverse 
Leveraged Buyouts (15 October 2006), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=937801> 
(using data compiled from 496 RLBOs from 1980–2002. The study found that of the 53 
returned to the market with a year all under-performed, providing ‘partial support for the 
claim that “flipping back” does not add value’: at 14). 
58 Blackstone Partners has begun the process of re-listing the online travel business 
Orbitz Worldwide, which it bought in August 2006. The prospectus discloses World Economy and Finance Working Paper  16 
 
                                                                                                            
exiting the public market reduces the regulatory and tax burden. This 
may make for more effective use of capital. It also has the potential to 
negatively impact on corporate tax revenue, key areas of concern in the 
parliamentary deliberations now underway in both Canberra and 
Westminster.
59 In narrowly defined financial terms, therefore, the private 
equity model appears to offer a superior framework. 
If, however, as noted above, out-performing the market is 
illusory outside the top quartile of funds, what other factors need to be 
considered to explain growing infatuation with the asset class. 
Regulatory flight appears superficially attractive, particularly in the 
United States.
60 Changes to the US corporate governance regime, 
including increased compliance costs and legal risk, are said to have 
made management much more amenable to the advantages of going 
private.
61 Regulators are under increasing pressure not to exercise 
instruments of control. Creative enforcement mechanisms, such as 
mandating governance change in exchange for a decision to stay or drop 
corporate prosecutions are presented, with partial judicial justification, as 
the illegitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
62 The cost (generated 
 
‘weaknesses in our material internal controls over financial reporting’ as well as an 
incomplete ‘global technology platform’, see Bill Barnhart, ‘Blackstone Wants to Abort 
Bumpy Flight on Orbitz’, Chicago Tribune (Chicago), 11 May 2007 (online edition). 
59 The extent to which tax arbitrage reduces revenue is, of course country specific. In 
Australia, debt-equity integrity rules were introduced in 2001 to prevent arbitrage 
lowering the corporate tax base, see Submission to Senate Standing Committee on 
Economics, Inquiry into the Private Equity Investment and its Effects on Capital Markets 
and the Australian Economy, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 11 May 2007, 5–6 (Ernst 
& Young). 
60 See McKinsey Report, Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services 
Leadership (2007) 83, 87; Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of 
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2006) 116–34. 
61 McKinsey, above n 60, 17; Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, above n 60, xii. 
62 The Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) in Washington has adopted a rules-
based protocol system, see SEC, Rules of Practice (2006). The Financial Services 
Authority in London frames its enforcement agenda around generic statements of 
regulatory principles, including efficiency and economy, the role of management, 
proportionality, international coordination and need to safeguard competition, see FSA, 
Principles of Good Regulation (2006). In essence, the principles differ little from 
guidance already offered by US counterparts, see in particular US Department of Justice 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organisations (2003). What does differ is 
the extent to which the default mechanism for securing behavioural change in the United 
States is enforcement rather than consultation driven, see John Coffee, ‘Law and the 
Market: The Role of Enforcement’ (Paper presented at the Dynamics of Capital Market 
Governance Workshop, Australian National University, 14 March 2007). Charting an Icarian Flightpath  17 
primarily by the audit profession itself) of validating internal control 
processes are blamed (on the SEC) for driving business off-market and 
offshore. On these accounts, the reprise of the LBO is simultaneously 
presented as a rational response to ill-considered political interference 
and evidential support for oversight retrenchment. 
Some critics go further and complain about the entire 
governance regime. Among them is Martin Lipton, one of the most 
influential and respected mergers and acquisitions lawyers in New York: 
‘The real motivation is dissatisfaction with the public market.’
63 Lipton 
built his practice on defending boards of management from hostile 
takeovers. His support for the current wave of takeovers derives 
primarily from the manner in which the corporate governance agenda has 
privileged process over strategy. Private equity is viewed as having a 
more effective governance system and, in the main, provides 
shareholders with a fair opportunity to exit: 
 
Most of these deals are fair deals, negotiated at arms length. 
These are not deals in which somebody is stealing the 
company. Most involve some kind of auction, or market test 
for the price and the institutions have been very successful in 
the UK, Western Europe and here in forcing an increase in 
price when they think the initial offering is inadequate.
64
 
Company directors are much more receptive to private equity 
entreaties, he argues, because they are ‘just fed up with external 
‘encrustations’ that affect their ability to manage the company.’
65 He 
suggests the assault on board authority from aggressive institutional 
investors has profoundly changed the corporate landscape. Lipton’s 
critique suggests that an enabling system of oversight would better 
protect the maintenance of the public model. The empirical evidence 
demonstrates that a light-touch principles-based approach to regulation 
does not necessarily guarantee the maintenance of public ownership. The 
                                                 
63 Interview with Martin Lipton (New York, 23 April 2007). 
64 Ibid. Lipton made his reputation by designing the so-called ‘poison pill’ defence in the 
1980s. Ratified by the Delaware Court of Chancery, the most important venue for 
adjudicating corporate disputes in the United States, the strategy imposed such onerous 
financial penalties that it dampened hostile takeovers for a generation. But for Lipton, 
two decades later market conditions make it almost impossible to sustain public 
ownership, especially if the price is reasonable, management agree and the process for 
managing market exit transparent. 
65 Ibid. World Economy and Finance Working Paper  18 
 
                                                
City of London, for example, has also witnessed an exponential increase 
in private equity activity. Funds raised through initial listing were 
outstripped by market exits in 2006. The result has been a reduction in 
share availability and concomitant decline in the value of the London 
market.
66  
Tracing a direct connection with differential regulatory 
responses to corporate scandal, therefore, offers an incomplete and 
potentially misleading causal explanation. Its power is further dissipated 
by the fact that major private equity providers are themselves not only 
seeking listing but seeking a highly conditional form of it in New York 
itself. What soul-searching there is in Wall Street about the future of the 
public corporation serves a much narrower purpose. It is designed solely 
to pressure regulators into reducing the regulatory burden, thereby 
protecting its competitive advantage vis-à-vis London. While private 
equity in the United States is used as a mechanism to cow regulators, 
across the Atlantic the debate is at once more nuanced and, potentially, 
more destabilising, precisely because it has disturbed the foundations of 
market capitalism. 
 
C  The Creative Destruction of Private Equity 
 
One of the most parsimonious heuristic metaphors for describing the 
impact of private equity comes from the noted mid-20
th century 
economist Joseph Schumpeter. Writing in the midst of a global 
conflagration, Schumpeter argued that the key public policy challenge 
facing capitalist society was how to manage its inherent disequilibrium. 
For Schumpeter, the ‘perennial gale’ of change ‘incessantly 
revolutionises the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying 
the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative 
Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.’
67 Change (potentially 
but not assuredly) emanates from the impact on the existing order from 
‘the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new 
source of supply, the new type of organisation.’ This challenge ‘strikes 
not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but 
at their foundations and their very lives.’
68
 
66 See FSA, ‘Discussion Paper 06/06’, above n 8, 3. 
67 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943) 84. 
68 Ibid. Charting an Icarian Flightpath  19 
Contrary to its usage by management consultants, who hijacked 
the term at the turn of the millennium to justify retrenchment, ‘creative 
destruction’ in the classic sense is far from unproblematic.
69 Change can 
weaken loyalty, trust and institutional knowledge. Contemporary 
ethnographies of the corporation highlight the internal social dislocation 
and anxiety this process generates for employees (including middle 
management).
70 ‘The divorce between command and accountability’, 
accentuated by what Sennett terms ‘a shortened framework of 
institutional time’, can lead to ‘social degradation’ for those not directly 
remunerated by implementation.
71 Failure can have much deeper 
resonance if, irrespective of foundation, the entity to which the individual 
is attached holds iconic status as the repository of national virtues.
72 
Thus, unless change is deemed essential or desirable, it is difficult to 
neutralise wider political objections.  
The private equity industry has proved increasingly adept at 
managing this process in the United States. The consortium bidding for 
control of the Texas utility company, TXU, used concern about climate 
change, for example, to justify a commitment to rescind plans to build 11 
new coal-fired power stations. This environmental altruism served an 
undeclared dual purpose. First, it neutralised the environmental lobby.
73 
Second, it justified an immediate retrenchment on capital investment.
74 
Likewise, Cerberus Capital Management’s planned acquisition of 
Chrysler is predicated on a sidebar agreement with the United Auto 
Workers trades union in which both sides accept unless the deal was 
                                                 
69 See, eg, Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction (2001). This myopic 
approach reduces both the range and application of Schumpeterian theory, see Thomas 
McCraw, Prophets of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction (2007) 6; 
see also Horst Hanusch and Andreas Pyka, ‘Principles of Neo-Schumpetarian 
Economics’ (2007) 31 Cambridge Journal of Economics 275. 
70 See, eg, Robert Puttnam, Bowling Alone (2000); Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of 
Character (1998). 
71 Richard Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism (2006) 57, 181. 
72 Georgina Born, Uncertain Vision: Birt, Dyke and the Reinvention of the BBC (2004). 
73 The proposed deal did cause some infighting among environmentalists after the event 
but not enough to scupper the initial support, see Rebecca Smith and Jim Carlton, 
‘Environmentalist Groups Feud Over Terms of TXU Buyout’, Wall Street Journal (New 
York), 3 March 2007, A1. 
74 Andrew Ross Sorkin, ‘A Buyout Deal that Has Many Shades of Green’, New York 
Times (New York), 27 February 2007, B1; see also Editorial, ‘The New Greenmail’, Wall 
Street Journal (New York), 27 February 2007, A16 (noting the public relations coup in 
enlisting the support of the environmental lobby but pointedly seeing an emergent 
alliance that could be detrimental to shareholders). World Economy and Finance Working Paper  20 
 
                                                
consummated, the company could file for bankruptcy protection.
75 
Absent this cover, private equity is exceptionally vulnerable to not just 
the politics of envy, but also the politics of fear. Both are likely to 
increase before this mergers and acquisitions cycle completes precisely 
because many of the corporations now being targeted are neither in 
distress nor intrinsically mismanaged, which is why the Qantas deal, to 
be explored in detail below, proved so problematic. 
In a highly-charged editorial, the Financial Times noted in 
December 2005 that ‘the private equity “barbarians” are back. Only this 
time they are not at the gate. They are inside the castle and holding a 
banquet fit for a king.’
76 A year on, the paper advised the industry to 
‘exercise discretion’.
77 Even those most bullish about the industry’s 
virtues accept that prudence is advisable. ‘People are making a lot of 
money; secondly they are making a lot of money with clear action’, 
accepts John Barber, managing partner of Citigroup Private Equity in 
New York.
78 ‘Layoffs, taking back working capital, moving 
headquarters, transferring businesses from Germany to Dallas are the 
sorts of action that attract attention. People are buying companies now 
that have impact, that touch upon enough workers, enough customers and 
touch government.’
79
The most powerful relationship impacted by private equity, 
however, is endogenous to the market. While the asset class generates 
substantial profits for the entrepreneurs leading vehicles, recruited 
management and those providing capital and advisory services, it forges 
the creation of powerful counter-coalitions by shifting the location of 
core value within the regulatory sub-system.
80  
In the battle for advantage, entrenched interests seek to maintain 
corporate or market dominance by injecting a moral and ethical 
 
75 See above n 30–1 and accompanying text. 
76 Editorial, ‘While the Sun Shines’, Financial Times (London), 3 December 2005, 14. 
77 Editorial, ‘Private Equity Should Beware its Own Success’, Financial Times (London), 
22 December 2006, 14. 
78 Interview with John Barber, above n 11. 
79 Ibid. 
80 See Paul Sabatier, ‘An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role 
of Policy Oriented Learning Therein’ (1988) 21 Policy Sciences 129 (linking policy 
change to intersection between manoeuvring within relative subsystem and ‘external 
perturbation, ie the effects of systemic events- changes in socio-economic conditions, 
outputs from other sub-systems and changes in the system wide governing coalition — 
on the resources and constraints of sub-system actors’: at 148). Charting an Icarian Flightpath  21 
dimension. ‘No social system can work in which everyone is supposed to 
be guided by nothing except his short-term utilitarian ends’, warned 
Schumpeter when he concluded that ‘the stock market is a poor 
substitute for the Holy Grail.’
81 The lack of transparency provides an 
opening for fund managers to castigate governance and regulatory 
arbitrage and deploy ideational resources to support legislative 
intervention.
82 One senior fund manager in the City of London suggests 
that the active support of management in private buy-outs simply 
increases the moral hazard.
83 He describes the market as being in a state 
of frenzy not seen since the 1980s: 
 
It is hard to make the comparison because you are older, 
wiser, perhaps more cynical, but it does feel way worse. What 
was once the preserve of the landed gentry is now something 
that someone of thirty-two years of age can aspire to because 
of the 50 million to 100 million they made over the past two 




While somewhat overblown, the intervention serves to dilute doctrinal 
faith, blur self-referential boundaries and weaken the conceptual 
foundations of associational governance.
85 Armed with this global 
                                                 
81 Schumpeter, above n 67, 137,  
82 Chantal Mouffe, On The Political (2005) 17–21. 
83 Interview with Michael Gordon, above n 22; for evidence of downward earnings 
manipulation pre-purchase, see T W Wu, ‘Management Buyouts and Earnings 
Management’ (1997) 12 Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 373 (finding 
evidence of accounting manipulation in 87 MBOs in the United States between 1980–
87). See also De-Wai Chou, Michael Gombola and Feng Ying Liu, ‘Earnings 
Management and Stock Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts’ (2006) 41 Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 407. On continuing debate on whether rising 
levels of corporate restatements are derived from increased oversight imposed by 
Sarbanes-Oxley or aggressive auditing, see despite accounting controls, see Deborah 
Solomon, ‘Treasury Targets Financial Fixes’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 18 May 
2007, C1. 
84 Interview with Michael Gordon, above n 22; for Australia, see Peter Weekes, ‘Equity, 
for Fund and Profit’, The Sunday Age (Melbourne), 20 May 2007 (online edition) 
(quoting Deutsche Bank Head of Private Wealth: ‘I have never in my life seen this much 
capital chasing deal flows. It considerably exceeds what we saw in 1999, which was 
obscene, and the whole thing ended in a flash in 2001’). 
85 As such, it represents an exogenous force with systemic opportunities (cf Sabatier, 
above n 80) and risks (cf Schumpeter, above n 67). World Economy and Finance Working Paper  22 
 
                                                
overview, we are now in a position to map more closely the interplay of 
forces on the regulatory debate in Australia itself. 
 
II CHARTING AN ICARIAN FLIGHTPATH 
 
With demand outstripping supply in fund development, subscription and 
acquisition targets, private equity has expanded beyond the core markets. 
Australia has become a core beachhead. From outlier, it has become the 
third biggest private equity arena outside the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The introduction of less restrictive employment 
conditions, low levels of corporate debt and a vibrant financial services 
sector have made Australia exceptionally attractive as both a source of 
targets and of funding. The combined value of planned and executed 
transactions in 2006 totalled AUS$27 billion, a significant spike on the 
previous five year average of AUS$1.5 billion.
86 This represents a 
fraction of the overall value of the businesses listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange.
87 It is difficult, however, to overstate the impact of 
private equity on the domestic corporate firmament. A senior partner in 
the Sydney office of Ernst & Young captured the mood with a colorful, if 
mixed, metaphor. The Australian corporate market, he reported, ‘is being 
trawled for fallen angels and there are no sacred cows.’
88 None appeared 
more so than Qantas, the Australian flag-carrier, which was subjected to 
the largest buy-out in aviation history. Unlocking the black box of the 
Qantas deal illuminates not only why the consortium lost control but also 
wider systemic defects. 
 
A  The Fall to Earth 
 
86 Reserve Bank of Australia, Statement on Monetary Policy (12 February 2007) 45. The 
trend continued into the first quarter of 2007, see Alan Jury, ‘Private Equity Interest 
Jumps,’ Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 30 March 2007, 79 (reporting AUS$4.2 
billion planned transactions in the first quarter, more than double the previous year). 
87 The Australian Venture Capital Association estimates the total value of private equity 
transactions to be under 1.54 per cent, of the capitalisation of the Australian Stock 
Exchange. Moreover, it estimates that even accounting for leverage, its members can 
only deploy AUS$40 billion, which would buy 2.74 per cent of the ASX, see AVCAL 
above n 13, 5, 20. 
88 Ernst & Young, ‘Mergers and Acquisitions Index’ (Press Release, 5 December 2006). 
Most Australian transactions were strategic realignments in response to regulatory change 
(Channel 7 and Channel 9) or partial divestiture of non-core business units (the sale of 
Myer Department Stores by the Coles Group). The single hostile bid saw Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts target Coles Group. The bid was rebuffed twice. Charting an Icarian Flightpath  23 
 
The life support system sustaining the most important putative private 
equity transaction in Australia was turned off at 9.10AM on Thursday 17 
May. In a statement to the ASX, Airline Partners Australia (‘APA’), the 
bidding consortium, conceded ‘in the current environment and 
circumstances a renewed offer on terms acceptable to APA would not be 
likely to succeed. On that basis APA has decided not to proceed with a 
renewed offer at this time’.
89 The phrasing is intriguing. It identifies a 
problem but not its parameters. Just what does the consortium mean by 
highlighting the ‘current environment and circumstances’? Given the 
global boom in private equity transactions, it appears, on the face of it, an 
unduly pessimistic assessment, particularly for a consortium driven by 
Macquarie, the pre-eminent investment bank in Australia and arguably 
already the largest private equity firm in the world.
90 The vaguely 
petulant reference to acceptable terms adds to the statement’s ambiguity. 
It hints at a subterranean conflict, which partially emerged in the legal 
argument over whether the consortium had, in fact, secured that 
mandatory 50 per cent support on the day the offer closed. 
APA based its threshold claim on a contractual clause that 
foreclosed the splitting of shareholdings. The clause informed potential 
participants they were deemed to have ‘irrevocably accepted’ the offer 
‘in respect of all your Qantas shares despite any difference between that 
number and the number of Qantas shares shown on the acceptance 
form.’
91 Whether and, if so, to what extent the untested contractual 
provision could be enforced, particularly when the investor in question 
bought additional shares, is questionable. Moreover, wresting control in 
such circumstances was never going to be sufficient to sway the court of 
public or political opinion (or indeed inure the consortium to the market). 
While the belated recognition of the contractual lock-in clause 
may have had technical value, it smacked of sharp practice. As John 
Durie noted sardonically in the Australian Financial Review, the clause 
‘was not designed as a trap for careless hedge funds.’
92 It also ran 
                                                 
89 APA (Press Release, 17 May 2007). 
90 Stuart Washington, ‘Winning Formula: Aggression and Persistence’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 19 May 2007 (online edition); Elizabeth Knight, ‘MacBank Does Have 
an Achilles Heel’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 16 May 2007 (online edition). 
91 APA Bidders Statement (2007) cl 7.3(f)(i). 
92 See Steve Creedy, ‘Qantas Takeover Farce May End in Court’, The Australian 
(Sydney), 8 May 2007, 1; John Durie, ‘Bid for Qantas Looks a Goner’, The Australian 
Financial Review (Sydney), 11 May 2007, 64. World Economy and Finance Working Paper  24 
 
                                                
counter to the strategy mounted throughout the takeover, opening the 
consortium to multiple sources of litigation risk, including from 
aggrieved shareholders and Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (‘ASIC’). Faced with ministerial questioning whether the 
shareholdings on which the claim was partially based may have been of 
doubtful legal validity, APA capitulated.
93 The rationale used then was 
also revealing:  
 
Given the amount of time it would take were the issue to be 
litigated, and the consequent uncertainty for both Qantas and 
its shareholders, APA has decided not to pursue arguments 
that it did achieve voting power in excess of 50 per cent by the 
offer deadline of 4 May 2007.
94
 
The statement deflected responsibility for failure from the financial 
engineers running the bid. Secondly, by not proceeding, the consortium 
presented itself as responsible corporate steward. Each assumption is 
highly questionable. 
By Friday 4 May, despite a concerted campaign that threatened 
an immediate collapse in the Qantas share price, the consortium 
struggled to reach even the minimum 50 per cent required to give the bid 
a two week statutory extension. At 8.30PM APA conceded market 
rejection.
95 APA intimated that the deal had ‘apparently’ failed because 
it had secured only a 45.66 per cent acceptance rate. A number of hours 
later a further economic interest of 4.96 per cent was extracted from a 
US-based hedge fund. This late acceptance formed the basis for the 
APA’s application to the Takeovers Panel. It argued that a technical 
failure to reach the threshold constituted ‘unacceptable circumstances’.
96 
No credible explanation was offered as to why the deadline had been 
missed beyond miscalculation. The Takeovers Panel was, not 
 
93 Qantas Sale Act 1992 (Cth) s 7(1)(a). 
94 APA (Press Release, 8 May 2007). 
95 APA (Press Release, 4 May 2007). 
96 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 657A(1)–(3). There is, however, no definition of what 
constitutes ‘unacceptable circumstances’. The Takeovers Panel has to adjudicate this by 
reference to an ‘efficient, competitive and informed markets’ (s 602) and its 
consideration of ‘the national interest’: Takeovers Panel ‘Unacceptable Circumstances’ 
Guidance Note No 1 (28 September 2004) 3. The Panel articulates the latter as the need 
to ‘consider wider issues such as: what signals its decision to make, or not to make, a 
declaration of unacceptable circumstances in individual cases, will send to the market and 
the wider investing community’: at 5. Charting an Icarian Flightpath  25 
surprisingly, unimpressed.
97 APA, it argued, had made it clear that the 
bid would lapse at 7.00PM on 4 May. From the panel’s perspective, the 
‘truth in takeovers’ principle meant absent compelling evidence to the 
contrary, the deadline must hold. APA launched an appeal and 
simultaneously pressed the ASIC to intervene. Both approaches were 
rebuffed.
98
It was only at this stage that APA pressed the ‘deeming’ clause, 
along with claims that institutional acceptance of the clause generated a 
further 6.09 per cent control (it was unclear whether this figures derives 
from the hedge fund approached on Friday evening).
99 Two explanations 
for the changed approach can credibly be advanced. First, APA was 
misguided in not availing of the mechanism to lock-in acceptances from 
institutional investors at a much earlier stage. Alternatively, in its 
desperation to get the deal across the line, the consortium momentarily 
revealed the endgame had the threshold been reached. In displaying but 
not utilising its hand, APA lost a key negotiating mechanism. It also 
fatally undermined the credibility of the consortium in the wider 
marketplace. 
Much media comment has focused on the errant behaviour of 
one US hedge fund.
100 The broader question of why the consortium 
failed to lock-in sufficient acceptances in advance repays considered 
attention. Institutional investors appeared to have committed the smallest 
proportion of their shares to maximise potential profits during the 
mandatory two week extension should the 50 per cent threshold have 
                                                 
97 Takeovers Panel, ‘Qantas Airways Limited 02 — Receipt of Application and Decision’ 
(Press Release, 6 May 2007); for full decision see In the Matter of Qantas 02R (2007) 
ATP 07.  
98 ASIC, ‘Statement on Qantas’ (Press Release, 7 May 2007). 
99 APA did not specify from whom it had secured this agreement or what percentage of 
existing shareholders would challenge the enforceability of the clause. For suggestion of 
the need to investigate whether three major hedge funds colluded in only committing the 
minimum required, see Stephen Bartholomeusz, ‘How Greedy Hedge Funds Wrecked 
Qantas Deal’, The Age (Melbourne), 8 May 2007 (online edition). 
100 Scott Rochfort, ‘Qantas Farce: Heads Will Roll’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 7 
May 2007, 1; Matthew Murphy, ‘Qantas Admits Takeover Bid Dead’, The Age 
(Melbourne), 7 May 2007, 1; James Hall, ‘Credibility at Stake at Every Corner’, 
Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 7 May 2007, 19; Jennifer Hewett, ‘Crash: Private 
Equity Falls Back to Earth’, The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 5–6 May 2007, 33; 
Katrina Nicholas, ‘MacBank Runs into Flak as Blame Games Takes Off’, Australian 
Financial Review (Sydney), 12–13 May, 2007, 26–7; Alan Kohler, ‘In the End APA 
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been reached. This was a rational trading strategy. At its most 
fundamental, judgment is reducible to trust and the market did not trust 
the consortium’s claims that the bid was on a knife-edge. Somewhat 
remarkably, the APA legal submission to the Takeovers Panel blamed 
this on the fact that ‘the market was misinformed as to the prospects of 
the bid succeeding and … it was this misinformation that induced Qantas 
shareholders into a false sense that they would have more time to accept 
the Offer than they actually did.’
101 Market unease intensified over the 
weekend as APA exhausted market and regulatory approaches. 
Investment banking sources in Sydney suggest privately that the 
approach adopted by the consortium while legally efficient was counter-
productive, adding, perhaps erroneously, to perceptions of hubris and 
arrogance in equal measure. 
At a broader political level, there could be no mistaking the 
federal government’s frustration. The final move came when the federal 
government ordered Qantas to identify whether the corporation had 
breached ownership rules by allowing untracked share trading.
102 
Somewhat lamely, the Qantas board replied that it was conducting an 
urgent reconciliation.  
Ultimately, it was the failure to manage this process that made 
the position of the Qantas chairperson untenable. At its first board 
meeting after the rejection, Margaret Jackson tendered her resignation, 
but only after it became clear that an increasingly desperate attempt to 
retain the position served to undermine her credibility in the wider 
corporate world.
103 Although, there is merit in the suggestion by the 
Treasurer, Peter Costello, that the regulatory ‘system has worked 
well’,
104 retracing the tortuous flight path of the Qantas bid reveals a 
multitude of weak points in the governance of MBOs in Australia. 
 
 
101 In the Matter of Qantas 02R (2007) ATP 07, 5. 
102 Qantas Sale Act 1992 (Cth) s 7(1)(g); Steve Creedy and Glenda Korporaal, ‘Canberra 
to Order Qantas Sell-Off’, The Australian (Sydney), 8 May 2007, 21. 
103 Katrina Nicholas and Vesna Poljak, ‘Jackson to Quit in Qantas Fallout’, Australian 
Financial Review (Sydney), 18 May 2007, 1. Jackson had earlier claimed that those who 
rejected the bid without recognising that it would have a material downward impact on 
the share price had ‘a mental problem with the operation of the market’. The statement 
served to transfer a recommendation into active lobbying. For the lobbying to retain her 
position, see Kate Askew, ‘Mental as Anything’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 12–
13 May 2007, 41. 
104 ‘Offer Over, Its Back to the Board’, The Australian (Sydney), 8 May 2007, 26. Charting an Icarian Flightpath  27 
B  The Deal Structure 
 
Qantas is one of the most profitable airlines in the world. An effective 
domestic duopoly and virtual stranglehold on the lucrative trans-Pacific 
routes ensured high passenger yields. Although vulnerable to exogenous 
forces, such as an outbreak of SARS or a future terrorist attack using 
commercial airlines, the corporation had devised and partially 
implemented an ambitious growth strategy. This was based on the 
exponential growth of Jetstar, the group’s low-cost subsidiary. Despite 
the opportunities, the stock languished on the Australian Stock 
Exchange, its legally mandated primary domicile.
105 It was not 
surprisingly that the board would countenance a private equity approach. 
Rebuffed by the Qantas board when it first offered AUS$5.35 a share, 
APA returned with a marginally improved offer the following day.
106 
Predictably enough, the bid fell within the fair price range calculated by 
independent advisors retained after the board endorsed the buy-out.
107
The bid was predicated on APA gaining a 90 per cent economic 
interest, which would allow for a compulsory purchase. It also involved 
the airline accruing AUS$8 billion dollars in debt. The proposed market 
exit of an (albeit privatised) island economy icon was always going to 
satisfy a national interest objection, the sole subjective criterion on which 
the government could block the sale. The first imperative for the 
consortium was to get clearance from Canberra. The consortium was 
carefully calibrated to allay political sensitivities. First, the retention of 
the existing senior management along with their strategy provided 
continuity. Second, private equity financing was presented as offering 
quantitative and qualitative benefits simply not attainable through public 
ownership. Potential conflicts, such as Macquarie’s management role in 
Sydney Airport (which could limit landing slots to competitors) were 
presented as synergies. Equally Allco Finance’s core aircraft leasing 
business was presented as evidence of airline experience. No mention 
was made that under private ownership there is no requirement for active 
tendering. Second, the consortium voluntarily (if belatedly) submitted to 
a Foreign Investment Review Board adjudication to demonstrate good 
                                                 
105 Qantas Sale Act 1992 (Cth) s 7(1)(k). 
106 14 December 2006. The offer represented a 60 per cent premium above the average of 
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faith (while protesting that it was unnecessary). The economic and voting 
interests were carefully aligned to avoid triggering formal regulatory or 











956.1 26.9  35.4 
Allco Finance   300  8.4  11.1 
Macquarie Bank  525.5  14.7  14.7 
Texas Pacific 
Group  
891 25  14.9 
Onex Partners   445.5  12.5  9 
Institutional 
Investors 
409.9 11.5  14.9 
Senior 
Management 
 — 1 
Total Australian    51.0  61.2 
Total Foreign    49.0  38.8 
 
Figure 1: The Qantas Control Play.  
 
Tough talking by the Treasurer, Peter Costello, that the 
government would ensure that the bid satisfied all legal requirements, 
was, however, just that. The cleverness of the deal lay in the fact that it 
backed the government into an ideological corner just months before a 
federal election. To thwart a legally compliant offer, which provided 
shareholders with a 60 per cent premium, would leave the government 
vulnerable to criticism that it had reneged on principle.
109 While the 
approach represented a logical extension of principle not to intervene in 
the operation of the market, the government claimed the consortium had 
                                                 
108 Allco Equity Partners subsequently changed its own constitution, mirroring that 
imposed on Qantas, by limiting foreign ownership in both absolute and aggregate terms, 
see Allco Equity Partners (Press Release, 6 March 2007). 
109 A view endorsed in some sections of the international business press, see Editorial, 
‘Qantas and the Markets’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 23 March 2007 (online 
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acquiesced to additional restraints through a formal enforceable 
undertaking: 
 
The Minister for Transport and Regional Services and I have 
negotiated and received a legally enforceable Deed from APA. 
The Deed has been provided voluntarily by APA and does not 
involve any commitments from the Commonwealth. In the 
event of a possible breach, the Commonwealth will be able to 
have the Deed enforced. The Deed will apply until APA no 
longer has a controlling interest in Qantas under the 




The undertaking was presented as the most detailed secured from 
a corporation in Australian history. In reality it was an exercise in 
political symbolism, totally devoid of substance.
111 Macquarie Bank was 
banned from voting on issues relating to Sydney Airport; it was not 
curtailed from engaging in the decision-making process. The requirement 
to retain jobs, regional services and maintenance facilities were all 
subject to ‘market conditions’. The restrictions only applied to the 
consortium and there was no mechanism to extend even symbolic 
political control to subsequent owners.
112 In its sole contribution to the 
debate, the opposition Labor Party promised to subject the document to 
extensive legal analysis, a promise that has not been publicly followed 
through. 
The consortium’s plans attracted more searching analysis from 
the Takeovers Panel, which ruled ‘a number of statements in, and 
omissions from the bidders statement ‘were sufficiently misleading to 
give rise to unacceptable circumstances.’
113 These concerns centred on 
                                                 
110 Peter Costello (Treasurer) and Mark Vaile (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Transport and Regional Services) ‘Qantas Airways Ltd’ (Joint Press Release, 6 March 
2007), available at <http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressreleases/2007/009.asp>. 
Similarly, Costello promised to ensure tax base would be protected, see Katrina Nicholas 
and Leonore Taylor, ‘Costello Puts Private Equity on Tax Alert’, Australian Financial 
Review (Sydney), 10 April 2007, 1. 
111 See David Crowe, ‘Promises Aplenty, but Hard to Enforce,’ Australian Financial 
Review (Sydney), 7 March 2007, 11. 
112 See Laura Tingle, ‘Political Nightmare in the Baggage Hold’, Australian Financial 
Review (Sydney), 7 March 2007, 9. 
113 Takeovers Panel, ‘Qantas Airways Limited — Panel Decision’ (Press Release, 20 
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the presentation of Texas Pacific Group’s (‘TPG’) track record in the 
airline industry. The carefully worded decision upheld a compliant from 
the Australian and International Pilots Association that the original 
bidders statement did not accurately reflect TPG’s investment strategy. 
The bidder statement gave the impression that TPG’s involvement was 
crucial to the resurgence of Continental and the exponential growth in 
the European low-cost carrier, Ryanair. It omitted to mention the speed 
with which TPG sold out its investment. The panel held: 
 
If the APA ownership consortium had no commitment from 
TPG to remain in the consortium while the consortium owns 
or controls Qantas, reference to TPG’s experience in the 
airline industry had the potential to mislead unless it was 
clearly qualified by disclosure that TPG retains the ability to 
sell down its entire investment in APA at any time from the 
completion of the APA offer.
114
 
It was certainly appropriate for the Takeovers Panel to adjudicate 
the case. What is surprising is that it took a union complaint to get this 
matter onto the agenda. With the opposition silent and the government 
hamstrung, adjudication passed to the market itself. A Melbourne-based 
fund manager controlling four per cent of Qantas attained celebrity status 
by rejecting the bid (on price not principle).
115 The rejection was 
sufficient to scupper any chance of compulsory purchase. With APA 
unable to gain sufficient support, the leveraging terms were renegotiated 
to enable the consortium gain majority shareholding of what would 
remain a publicly listed corporation. The covenants were so weak that 
one investment banker described them as non-existent. The debt was 
 
114 Ibid. 
115 Katrina Nicholas, ‘The Man Who Said No’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 31 
March 2007, 22–3 (Andrew Sissons, Managing Director of Balanced Asset Management, 
alleged that market pressure for the deal to proceed meant that his investment strategy, 
based on a three year value cycle was subjected to a ‘continuous stream of deliberate 
misinformation’: at 22. He also rejected accusations that he was merely looking for a 
higher price. ‘Our game is relative, and theirs is absolute … We understand their rules, 
but we don’t want to play by them’: at 23). UBS Global Asset Management, which held 
six per cent of the airline also held out, without publicly declaring its hand (despite the 
fact that the parent investment banking arm of the business stood to gain AUS$40m in 
transaction fees); in the United States, public rejection rates are rising, particularly when 
management is retained, see Gretchen Morgensen, ‘Just Say No to Lowball Buyout 
Offers’, New York Times (New York), 20 May 2007 (online edition). Charting an Icarian Flightpath  31 
secured in stock rather than assets.
116 In effect, the banks offered one of 
the largest bridging finance deals ever seen, precisely the kind of 
transaction that has so worried the Federal Reserve in Washington.
117
The revised strategy, disclosed to the stock exchange, indicated 
that AUS$4 billion would be returned to the new owners through a 
combination of earnings and increased debt. The disclosure made 
manifest the theoretical returns associated with the financial engineering, 
embarrassing both the government and just as significantly the banks 
providing the financing. Investment banking sources in Sydney suggest 
privately that proceeding with the deal at that stage was both a tactical 
and strategic mistake. The covenant-lite strategy sent an unmistakable 
message that risk management systems were predicated on maintaining 
access to underwriting assignments. More problematically, it served to 
fuel criticism. Media coverage turned hostile.
118 In addition, any 
remaining political capital was squandered. In such circumstances, it was 
inevitable that when the deal ran into trouble that no intervention would 
be forthcoming. 
The financial stakes, the lauded political skills associated with 
Macquarie and the technical nature of the deadline breech gave the 
consortium an arguable case for proceeding. The hybrid nature of the 
Australian regulatory system, based on an admixture of rules and 
principles, gave flexibility to the Takeovers Panel to adopt a responsive 
reading of unacceptable circumstances. By rejecting the claim on literal 
grounds, the Takeovers Panel sent an unambiguous signal back to the 
business community.
119 The Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission reinforced this. Whether by accident or design, the planned 
legal challenge represented a challenge to the legitimacy of the 
                                                 
116 See Malcolm Maiden, ‘Bankers Are Being Very Brave’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 13 April 2007, 19 (a ‘global precedent for aggression in private equity bid 
funding’); see also Elizabeth Knight, ‘It’s the Mother of All Margin Loans’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 13 April 2007, 19. It also demonstrated the growing 
importance of hybrid markets, which mirrors the ‘stub equity’ financing now introduced 
in the United States, see Dennis Berman, ‘Unusual Buyout Offers a Piece to 
Shareholders’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 27 April 2007, A1, A12. 
117 See above n 10 and accompanying text. 
118 See Scott Rochfort, ‘Raiders to Gouge $4 b from Qantas’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 13 April 2007, 1; Scott Rochfort, ‘Qantas Raiders May Share Spoils’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 13 April 2007, 19; Steve Creedy, ‘APA to Rip $4bn out of 
Qantas’, The Australian (Sydney), 13 April 2007, 19; Kate Askew and Scott Rochfort, 
‘Bigger Debt Could Undo Qantas’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 April 2007, 39. 
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regulatory process. Furthermore, it placed the consortium on a collision 
path with the federal government. The timing here is instructive. The 
Treasury’s call for Qantas to reconcile its share register was made only 
when all other avenues had been exhausted. In so doing, it made a 
difficult case to argue unsustainable. Amid rumours that it was targeting 
British Airways, APA withdrew and pulled down its website. Macquarie 
released operating profits of AUS$1.5 billion that the chief executive 
argued provided ‘a very convincing measure of our reputation’.
120
The Qantas fiasco was blamed on tactical misjudgment by a 
‘number of key investors’, partial recognition that the sole focus on 
Samuel Heyman’s hedge fund operation is misplaced. Moss sought, 
however, to apportion blame to the activities of hedge funds more 
generally, which had been encouraged to enter the share registry 
precisely because they were likely to sell. The failure to handle the 
process could cost Macquarie dear in terms of relations with key players 
in the hedge fund community in the future.
121 A second embarrassment, 
involving the failure to gain control of Alinta was also blithely cast 
aside.
122 As the Bank changed ‘from being an Australian institution 
growing internationally to a global institution headquartered in Australia 
… our business is way bigger than two transactions in one country.’
123
With significant opportunities occurring offshore, there is a 
reduced imperative to foster domestic relations or exercise restraint. The 
insouciance suggests that Macquarie growth model centres solely on 
financial returns. It is undoubtedly successful. The dominance over the 
Australian market makes exercising control much more problematic. In 
such circumstances, the only credible restraint can come from a wider 
industry commitment to a redesigned regulatory framework. 
 
III ALIGNING AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
 
Market exit reduces public oversight. It allows the de-listed corporation 
to bypass the elaborate corporate governance, financial reporting and 
 
120 Eric Johnston, ‘Global MacBank Roars to Record $1.5bn Profit’, Australian Financial 
Review (Sydney), 16 May 2007, 1 (58 per cent of total income was attributed to the 
takeover boom, with the profits rising by 78 per cent). 
121 See Danny John, Lisa Murray and Kate Askew, ‘Up, Up and Away’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 19–20 May 2007, 41, 45. 
122 See below n 143–4 and accompanying text. 
123 Johnston, above n 120 (reporting that Macquarie carried out 240 transactions valued at 
AUS$160 billion globally). Charting an Icarian Flightpath  33 
disclosure obligations imposed after the collapse of Enron and other 
corporations in both the United States and here in Australia. The 
transformative potential (and risk) occurs at a number of levels. As noted 
above these include, but are not limited to: the impact of entreaties on the 
governance of target corporations; the efficacy of fiduciary duty, 
conflicts of interest management systems and codes of conduct as 
restraining forces on financial intermediary self-dealing; and the danger 
of market manipulation and wider macroeconomic instability.
124 These 
challenges pertain irrespective of whether the regulatory regime adopted 
is primarily mandatory (US), enabling (UK), or combined (Australia). As 
the debate over private equity intensifies, so to does the contestation over 
the efficacy of control mechanisms at each node in the overarching 
matrix.
125 The discussion below centres primarily on the Australian legal 
and regulatory framework in the aftermath of the Qantas debacle. 
 
A  The Limits of Directorial Discretion 
 
For the senior management of the corporation and its professional 
advisors the pre-contract stage is the most problematic. How each node 
manages the potential conflict with existing shareholders or their 
delegated authority, the board of directors, over what constitutes the 
long-term interests of the corporation determines the integrity of the 
wider corporate governance architecture. Insofar as the strategic 
decisions are taken in good faith and with reasonable diligence, the 
business judgment default applies.
126 Directors have a statutory 
obligation to disclose any potential conflict of interest.
127 They also have 
a common law obligation to ‘identify clearly the perceived conflict and 
to suggest a course of action to limit the possible damage.’
128 The boom 
                                                 
124 See above n 5–10 and accompanying text. 
125 For a measured summation of the contours of this battle, see Editorial, ‘Barbarians 
Back in the Dock, Economist (London), 1 March 2007, 10 (arguing that while many of 
the claims made against private equity, particularly asset stripping are easily refuted the 
fees charged for asset management are largely warranted). 
126 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 201, 180(1), 180(2) respectively. 
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in LBOs involving entrenched management makes this process 
exceptionally difficult to manage.
129
The pre-eminent obligation on the board is to ascertain whether 
the sale of the corporation is in its best interest. This is determined by 
reference to both procedural fairness and price. Guidance recently 
provided by the Takeovers Panel is designed to articulate what both 
mean in practice. Participating insiders should disclose the proposed buy-
out approach to the board prior to the provision of non-public 
information.
130 In addition, this information should only be disclosed 
with board consent.
131 On immediate notification of a potential bid, the 
board is advised to establish protocols to distance the corporation from 
the conflicted managers. 
While noting the absence of a legal requirement to launch a full 
auction, the Takeovers Panel argues that financial information should be 
made freely available to trigger (at the very least) a rival bid. Failure by a 
target company board to do so would, it is suggested, be viewed with 
suspicion.
 132 Both the draft and final versions of the guidance ostensibly 
reject a prescriptive approach. They resolve potential 
incommensurability problems by requiring significantly more robust 
systems of control.
133 It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
 
129 The failure to manage these conflicts has sparked open criticism from Don Argus, 
Chairman of BHP Billiton, see Andrew Cornell, ‘Boards Out of Step with Takeover 
Frenzy: Argus’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 15 May 2007, 1. 
130 Takeovers Panel, ‘Insider Participation in Control Transactions’ Draft Guidance Note 
No 19 (2007) [12]; Takeovers Panel, Guidance Note No 19, above n 6, [19]; 
131 Takeovers Panel, Guidance Note No 19, above n 6, [19(b)(i)]. 
132 Ibid [25]. 
133 Takeovers Panel, Issue Paper No 19, above n 6, [18]. The protocols include 
determination that control over the bid rests with non-executive directors through an 
Independent Board Committee (‘IBC’). IBC representatives should attend all meetings 
between participating management and bidder, ensure all communication between the 
bidder and participating management goes through IBC, require participating 
management to (temporarily) resign from executive or board positions and secure 
confirmation from participating management that no non-public information has been 
disclosed. The final version of the guidance makes clear that these were illustrative rather 
than a de facto standard, see Takeovers Panel, Insider Participation in Control 
Transactions  (Public Consultation Response Statement, 7 June 2007) 5.  See also 
Takeovers Panel, Guidance Note No 19, above n 6, [18–19] (highlighting the fact that 
participating insiders should only ‘in appropriate circumstances, stand aside or resign 
from their management/board positions in order to pursue the proposed bid (recognising 
that certain legal and equitable obligations, including with respect to confidentiality and 
use of information may continue notwithstanding such resignation and subject to the Charting an Icarian Flightpath  35 
guidance will change corporate practice. Significantly, while the chief 
executive of the utility company Alinta resigned because of the potential 
conflict, his counterpart in Qantas remained in place, oblivious (or 
dismissive) of the Takeovers Panel deliberations. While the Qantas board 
designed its own protocols in advance of the draft guidance, it is 
certainly arguable that the bid would have had much more credibility if 
Geoff Dixon and the other conflicted managers had stepped aside once 
the Takeovers Panel had intervened. 
 
B  Investing in Conflict 
 
The transformation of investment banks from passive provider of capital 
or advisory services to active fund managers represents a significant 
recalibration of the integrated banking model.
134 The surge in Macquarie 
Bank’s profits was inextricably linked to its global private equity 
operation. Goldman Sachs recently announced plans to launch a US$19 
billion superfund. Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity Partners already 
controls one of the top ten private equity funds. Both saw overall profits 
increase dramatically last year.
135 Merrill Lynch’s unit reported a 300 per 
cent increase in profits for the second quarter in 2006, in part because of 
the profits accruing from the Hertz ‘flip back’.
136 The contribution these 
units make to group profits demonstrates their critical importance. One 
Capital Partners, the private equity arm of J P Morgan, contributed 
US$550 million of the US$3.5 billion profit announced in 2006. 
The situation is exacerbated by debate over at what precise stage 
investment banks owe fiduciary duties to their clients and whether these 
restrictions can or should be contracted out by sidebar arrangements.
137 
                                                                                                             
board's ongoing right to require assistance from those insiders during any leave of 
absence’: at [19(b)(ii)] ) 
134 Innovation, however, does not guarantee success, as the failure of the Qantas bid 
demonstrates, see Jennifer Hewett and Glenda Korporaal, ‘It’s Red Faces at MacBank’, 
The Australian (Sydney), 8 May 2007, 27. 
135 Heidi Moore, ‘Revenue Gap Widens’, Financial News Online, 26 February 2007 
(Goldman profits increased by 52 per cent; Merrill Lynch 37 per cent). 
136 On the Hertz deal, see above n 57 and accompanying text. 
137 See Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of 
Interests’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 478.  The Federal Court denied 
jurisdictional authority on the grounds that contractual terms can exclude fiduciary duty, 
see ASIC v Citigroup  NSD 651 of 2006 ((28 June 2007) [266-281] (‘Whether a party is 
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Recent market practice calls into question the limits of internally policed 
and validated codes of conduct in dealing with this problem.
138 
Macquarie Bank, for example, found itself in an overt conflict in the 
machinations surrounding a MBO at Alinta. The utility company, to 
examine a range of strategic options, retained Macquarie, which then 
surfaced as a key advisor to the management-led buy-out team. When the 
potential conflict was initially reported, both Macquarie and Alinta 
proclaimed that their actions were within legal boundaries. The Bank 
sought to clarify its position but not before it had been very publicly 
sacked and the chief executive officer resigned.
139
A critical part of the regulatory infrastructure to curtail insider 
trading and market manipulation among financial intermediaries has 
been to foster the creation and maintenance of ‘Chinese Walls’. These 
impose a structural separation between corporate ‘insiders’ (for example, 
those advising external corporations on mergers and acquisitions or 
running private equity funds) and ‘outsiders’ (for example, those trading 
on behalf of clients or the bank’s own account on the basis of publicly 
available information).
140  
Within the private equity context, the rise in proprietary trading 
raises significant questions about the quality of the oversight process, in 
 
circumstances known to the parties and the purpose and object of the transaction: at 
[281]). 
138 Whether compliance is an adequate framework is highly questionable. For a 
spectacular case involving its failure, see Randall Smith, Kara Scannell and Paul Davies, 
‘A Brazen Insider Scheme Revealed’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 2 March 2007, 
C1 (reporting an insider trading case involving a lawyer working for the compliance 
department of Morgan Stanley relaying information to an analyst at UBS who, in turn, 
forwarded it to a hedge fund manager at Bear Stearns). 
139 ‘Alinta Boss Quits over Management Buy-Out Row’, Australian Financial Review 
(Sydney), 12 January 2007, 1. This is a problem that crosses jurisdictions. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, Goldman Sachs was involved in the buy-out of British Airports 
Authority just months after providing its board with strategic advice on how to rebuff 
such an approach. In the event, a subsequent bid by Macquarie for control of Alinta was 
rebuffed, see Brett Clegg, ‘No Patsies around this Time to Subsidise the Fee Factory’, 
Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 31 March 2007, 12–13. 
140 The leading authority in the United Kingdom accepts that while Chinese Walls can 
have a place, unless it can be demonstrated that controls work, there is an assumption that 
information will travel within the firm, see Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 WLR 
215, 235 (Millett LJ); in Australia the regulator faced an embarrassing setback when a 
high profile case against Citigroup was dismissed on the facts pleaded. The court ruled, 
however, that on the same facts ‘Chinese Walls may not be as solid as the name implied, 
see ASIC v Citigroup, NSD651 of 2006 (28 June 2007) [604].  Charting an Icarian Flightpath  37 
particular whether informational barriers prevent the trading of non-
public information. While regulators in Australia have been careful not 
to become embroiled in deal specific private equity controversies, there 
can be no mistaking unease. This concern was particularly apparent in 
draft guidelines offered by the Takeovers Panel over the integrity 
questions posed by the integrated investment banking model: 
 
The Panel does not intend to impede normal business 
transaction or relationships, which are not relevant in the 
context of a control transaction. However, the Panel will be 
concerned if professional and other advisors who, by reason of 
their previous association with a target company have come 
into possession on non-public information seek to become part 




The actions of both the senior management and Macquarie in the 
Alinta case, for example, would appear to trigger regulatory concern 
identified above.  
 
IV THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 
 
Mapping how ideational discourse is calibrated requires detailed analysis 
across a number of key stages, including control over the agenda, 
implementation and evaluation.
142 How are different constituencies 
organising and mobilising themselves. How is change in one jurisdiction 
experienced elsewhere? How are pressures to reform regulatory practice 
transmitted from one jurisdiction to another, and by which methods? 
What is the mediating impact of intervening variables, such as national 
structures, institutions, political preferences and societal interests? 
Within the scope of this paper it is only possible to sketch the outlines of 
                                                 
141 Takeovers Panel, Issue Paper No 19, above n 6, [11]. The final version resiles from 
this absolute position, see Takeovers Panel, Guidance Note No 19, above n 6. (‘An entity 
which has such information through its role as an adviser to the target will not be 
regarded as an “insider” for the purposes of this Guidance Note where it is acting in a 
different capacity in relation to a bid or potential bid, if there are appropriate and 
effective Chinese walls in place and the significant non-public information is quarantined 
from that part of the entity which is so acting’: at [11].) 
142 Tony Porter and Karsten Ronit, ‘Self-Regulation as Policy Process: The Multiple and 
Criss-Crossing Stages of Private Rule Making’ (2006) 39 Policy Sciences 41. World Economy and Finance Working Paper  38 
 
                                                
this process, in large part because we are at such an early stage in the 
private equity cycle. 
The preference for self-regulation is particularly evident in the 
private equity firmament. What has also become clear is that the industry 
has become increasingly cognisant of the need to enlist support or at least 
nullify external criticism.
143 The creation of a Private Equity Council in 
Washington on 26 December 2006 by the premier funds — including 
Blackstone, KKR and Carlyle — is an indication of just how important it 
has become to pro-actively manage the policy process, even in the 
United States.
144 Signaling over tax issues, in particular whether ‘carried 
interest’ represented capital gains has spooked the industry. Private 
equity spokespersons gave a particularly desultory performance at the 
Westminster Treasury Select Committee recently. Their performance 
was not helped by the quip by a senior practitioner that cleaners pay 
more tax.
145 Likewise, in the United States, former Treasury Secretary 
Robert Rubin, now Vice Chairman at Citigroup, has maintained that the 
case exists to look at the private equity tax base. Private equity funds 
have also sought to influence the wider debate through a series of funded 
research initiatives and the establishment of extensive lobbying 
networks.
146
A comparison of the debate in London and New York highlights 
differential political priorities and ideational referents. In the United 
States, the debate is still carried out at a rather technical level in which 
wider socio-political considerations are deemed irrelevant. The takeover 
 
143 Lionel Barber and Peter Smith, ‘Permira Accepts Need to Be More Open’, Financial 
Times (London), 22 February 2007, 1. 
144 Carlyle Group, ‘Private Equity Council is Formed to Provide Research and 
Information’ (Press Release, 26 December 2006) available at  
<http://www.carlyle.com/eng/news/l5-news3673.html>; see also Lowenstein, above n 14 
and accompanying text. 
145 ‘Taken to the Cleaners’, The Economist (London), 12 June 2007 (online edition).  As 
The Economist notes, however, the danger is that changing tax structures will simply 
encourage private equity firms to relocate to more favorable regimes,  
146 Private equity funds announced a two million dollar research project at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos. It will be coordinated by the Dean of Columbia Business 
School, Glenn Hubbard. Here in Australia, the Australian Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association has retained professional consultants to provide research 
demonstrating added value. Its submission to the Senate Inquiry prominently displays a 
favourable quote from the FSA on the utility of private equity on its cover sheet. 
Nowhere in the submission does it respond to the FSA’s concerns about market 
manipulation and insider-trading, see AVCAL, above n 13 and accompanying text. Charting an Icarian Flightpath  39 
of failing car company Chrysler illustrates differences in attitude 
between New York and London. As noted above, it is indicative of 
private equity’s growth that it secured control with relatively little 
opposition. Moreover, the restructuring, redesign and re-engineering 
however brutal, is seen as a necessary corrective to the problems of 
public market bureaucracy. ‘There is a reason why Toyota is the number 
one car company in the United States at least in terms of profitability’, 
says John Barber of Citigroup Private Equity in New York.
147
 
It is because for 35 years the unions thought short-term about 
how many people they thought should be employed, what they 
should make, and the work rules, and for that reason they have 
driven Detroit into ruin. When private equity firms come in 
they are making companies which are going to be much more 




This rationale has been widely accepted within political discourse in the 
United States. Notwithstanding the House Financial Services Committee 
Hearings, with the potential exception of tax, change is much more likely 
to emanate from the global export of initiatives now under way in the 
United Kingdom, which offers a mediation between European rejection 
and American embrace. 
Oppositional rhetoric in the United Kingdom has not quite 
descended to that heard in Germany, where private equity funds have 
been castigated as ‘locusts’, but it has come close. The leading private 
equity fund Permira has been subject to a virulent campaign of abuse. 
This included parading a camel outside a church service attended by its 
chief executive, Damon Buffini.
149 Substantial job losses at high-profile 
acquisitions in the United Kingdom such as at the Automobile 
Association, National Car Parks and Birds Eye, have galvanised union 
opposition, according to the General Secretary of the Trades Union 
Congress (‘TUC’), the peak movement for organised labor. 
 
                                                 
147 Interview with John Barber, above n 11. 
148 Ibid. 
149 The insult relates to a Bible parable that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye 
of a needle than get into heaven, see ‘Damon Buffini’, Profile, Money Week (London), 23 
February 2007, 40. World Economy and Finance Working Paper  40 
 
                                                
In all of those cases there have been issues of union 
recognition or job cuts in ways that are seen as simply not 
acceptable. The ultimate owners are not seen as people who 
can be engaged or properly held accountable for the decisions 
that they are ultimately responsible for.
150
 
As with Australia, union membership and influence went into 
precipitous decline in the United Kingdom. Paradoxically, private equity 
has reversed that process. The TUC has now emerged as potentially the 
most effective alternative voice within the European Union. It has done 
so not by strike action but by embarrassing both the government and the 
private equity movement through adopting the language of governance 
and transparency. 
The bombastic way in which private equity has presented 
leverage as tax efficient has undermined somewhat the credibility of its 
claims of responsible corporate citizenship. By raising the issue now, the 
unions raise an inevitable corollary: why hasn’t New Labour stepped in? 
The departure of Tony Blair has forced contenders for the New Labour 
leadership to attend much more closely to underpinning ideological 
principles. The political changing of the guard thus provided a time-
limited opportunity for the unions to influence the direction of policy. In 
a recent speech, Barber likened the private equity funds to ‘amoral asset 
strippers after a quick buck.’
151  
Despite the rhetoric, Barber has also recognised that engagement 
rather than confrontation is more likely to generate results. The key 
leverage device has been the 300 billion under asset management with 
trades union pension funds. ‘We have in the TUC a network of a 1000 
trustees and we are working on a briefing note for that network. It will 
not be saying just pull out of private equity. That would be naïve.’
152 
Instead the unions are working on a draft set of protocols governing how 
the pension funds intermediate with private equity. 
Paradoxically, the global private equity boom has been driven by 
the injection of capital from the very source that the reinvigorated 
corporate governance paradigm posits as exercising the necessary control 
over managerial excess. Across the capital markets public pension funds 
 
150 Interview with Brendan Barber (London, 23 March 2007). 
151 Christopher Adams and Peter Smith, ‘TUC Chief Attacks Private Equity Industry’, 
Financial Times (London), 20 February 2007, 1. Barber further claimed the industry was 
‘pretty much allowed to operate with impunity’: ibid. 
152 Ibid. Charting an Icarian Flightpath  41 
have made a strategic decision to invest heavily in private equity but 
done little to agitate for stronger contractual covenants.
153 Just as 
problematically, notwithstanding claims of ethical investment, there is 
reduced emphasis on potential costs to current members.
154 According to 
the TUC General Secretary, the aim in starting a dialogue with the 
trustees is strategic: ‘It will be asking them to encourage them to 
consider the kinds of businesses and the approach to business that private 
equity takes.’
155 The first step is the development of key protocols that 
are capable of monitoring and enforcement.. 
 
The challenge is for us to identify in more precise terms than 
we have done to date what are the principles that we expect 
the private sector to live up to. We have to think through how 
that can be articulated. We have to think through both the 
principles and some mechanism of securing compliance, 
otherwise the principles themselves can be pretty vacuous.
156
 
Having re-found its voice, the trades union movement is unlikely 
to accept entreaties by either the industry or Treasury to leave the 
governance of private equity to a technocratic elite. In so doing it may be 
providing a scarce public good. In this regard, the defensive and narrow 
approach adopted by the Australian superannuation industry to the 
Senate Inquiry is not only shortsighted. It is also arguably an abdication 
of responsibility. The creative destruction of private equity forces may 
reduce the degree of public oversight. It also enhances the degree to 
which private equity owners – including the pension funds – must take 
responsibility for stakeholders whose voice has been silenced.  
                                                 
153 Alan Murray, ‘How Labor’s Pension Funds Are Playing Private Equity Two Ways’, 
Wall Street Journal (New York), 28 February 2007, A10 (quoting research that 22 per 
cent of all new money raised for private equity funding in the United States in 2005 
derived from labor superannuation schemes). Sometimes the dialectic between disclosure 
and privacy can pertain within the one investor. Contrast, for example, the shareholder 
activism displayed by California Public Employees Pension Fund within the corporate 
governance arena generally with its resistance to the release of information relating to its 
own private equity investments: see Hurdle, above n 40, 255–7. 
154 A case in point is the Qantas superannuation fund, which declined to mandate the 
voting interests of the three investment managers with delegated authority over its stake 
in the airline: see ‘Qantas Staff Fund Won’t OK Takeover’, The Australian (Sydney), 8 
February 2007, 23. 
155 Interview with Brendan Barber, above n 154. 





As this paper has demonstrated, the expansion of private equity poses a 
series of interconnected risks to both the corporate governance paradigm 
and to the regulation of the markets. Whether individual corporations 
undertake novel financing arrangements or acquiesce to excessive debt 
levels are, of course risk appetite decisions best left to the business itself. 
In that regard, for example, the federal government’s decision to allow 
the Qantas sale to proceed, given that it did not breach legal restraints, 
was both rational and, in the circumstances, justified. What the takeover 
boom has also demonstrated, however, is the paucity of guidance to 
ensure that appropriate checks and balances are in place to limit 
managerial incentives to de-list. 
The policy advice provided by the Takeovers Panel here in 
Australia is a credible attempt to close down some of the loopholes. It 
also highlights the critical importance of linking abstract principles to 
granular articulations of what these principles mean in practice. This 
goes some way to ensuring that potential directorial abuses are 
minimised and that shareholder interests will be protected. This does not 
solve, however, the wider question of the impact of private equity on the 
wider corporate governance paradigm. Restoring faith in market forces 
requires participants to pay much greater attention to the interwoven 
relationship between the market, legal restraints and the political process. 
Public listing provides a mechanism to reinforce the softer conceptions 
of governance associated with stakeholder rights, if only because there 
are opportunities to hold the company to account. An expansion of 
private equity may also lead to an erosion of conceptions of corporate 
social responsibility not least because success is measured on strictly 
financial terms. 
A more difficult regulatory challenge is how to link acceptance 
of market risk with the development of more sophisticated mechanisms 
to ensure it is carried out within acceptable levels of probity. The 
transaction fees involved certainly raise at least the prospect that internal 
restraining mechanisms may not be powerful enough to ensure effective 
due diligence. This problem pertains throughout the investment cycle, 
from provision of strategic advice to rebuff or acquiesce in a leverage 
buy-out, through to the IPO allocation when private equity seeks to 
dispose of the asset.  Charting an Icarian Flightpath  43 
The increasing involvement of investment banking in the 
management of private equity funds reinforces the potential problems. 
The difficulties are magnified precisely because regulators have been 
placed increasingly on the defensive over the limits of regulatory 
authority. Just as private equity providers have only themselves to blame 
for poor media management of their personal lives, strategic 
miscalculations on the part of the regulator can lead to seepage of media 
and political support. 
Private equity does offer many benefits, not least the possibility 
of energising tired corporate models. It also poses substantial risks. How 
it should be regulated is a matter of profound public concern. What is 
required is sustained engagement between regulators, the professions and 
market participants. This debate is a vital component of the due diligence 
necessary to moderate the forces of creative destruction unleashed across 
global financial markets. 
 
 